India’s Historical Position on Nuclear Patents
For an extraordinarily long time, India’s patent law had a simple position on anything nuclear.
No patents. Full stop.
If an invention was considered to be “relating to atomic or nuclear energy,” it did not matter what the invention actually did. Safety improvement? Measurement device? Industrial monitoring tool? The answer was still the same.
This framework explains why India’s patent practice around nuclear-adjacent inventions became so defensive. The law did not distinguish between strategic nuclear technology and civilian or industrial innovation. It treated a safety monitoring device and a fuel enrichment process as part of the same legal universe.
As a result, patent applicants learned quickly. If an invention operated in a nuclear environment, mentioning that fact could be fatal. Many applications were amended to remove references to nuclear use. Others were never filed in India. Some inventions were protected abroad but deliberately kept out of the Indian system.
This entire structure rested on one assumption: anything connected to atomic energy must remain under absolute State control.
That position has now changed materially.
The December 2025 Legislative Shift
In December 2025, Parliament enacted a new nuclear legislation and, quietly but decisively, rewrote Section 4 of the Patents Act. This is not a cosmetic change. It alters how entire categories of innovation are evaluated.
Let us unpack what changed and what this means in practice. At the heart of that framework was Section 20 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, a provision that effectively decided the fate of nuclear inventions long before the Patents Act could even be meaningfully applied.
Section 20 did not merely discourage patenting. It actively removed the possibility of patent protection.
Under that provision, no patent could be granted for any invention which, in the opinion of the Central Government, was useful for or related to the production, control, use, or disposal of atomic energy. The language went much further. It explicitly covered prospecting, mining, extraction, chemical treatment, fabrication, enrichment, handling of radioactive substances, and even technologies meant to ensure safety in atomic energy operations.
In other words, the law did not just target reactors or fuel cycles. It swept in everything around them, including safety systems and operational technologies.
What made this framework particularly strict was not just the breadth of activities it covered, but who decided. The Central Government had the final word. The Controller of Patents could refer any application to the Government, and once the Government formed an opinion that the invention related to atomic energy, refusal was mandatory. There was no appeal, no balancing exercise, and no room for interpretation by the Patent Office.
Section 4 as a Blanket Prohibition
Earlier, Section 4 operated as a blanket prohibition. If the Department of Atomic Energy took the view that an invention “related to atomic energy,” the patent application could not proceed. There was no discretion built into the law. Once the label applied, refusal followed automatically. This meant that inventions were often rejected not because they were dangerous or sensitive, but simply because of the environment in which they were used.
As a result, applicants routinely avoided using words like “nuclear” or “atomic” in their patent filings. Some narrowed their claims unnaturally. Others chose not to file in India at all, even for technologies that were clearly civilian in nature.
The amended Section 4 takes a quite different approach. It no longer says that patents cannot be granted. Instead, it says that patents may be granted for inventions relating to nuclear energy, subject to safeguards under the new nuclear law.
“38.(1) The Central Government may grant patents for inventions which in its opinion are for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and radiation:
Provided that the inventions relating to activities specified in sub-section (5) of section 3, or which in the opinion of the Central Government, are sensitive in nature or having national security implications, shall not be patentable and such invention shall be deemed to have been made or conceived by the Central Government.”
That shift from “shall not” to “may” is not cosmetic. It fundamentally changes how such inventions are evaluated.
This is where the change becomes meaningful for industry and R&D.
A system that detects leaks, overheating, vibration, or radiation anomalies in a nuclear facility would earlier carry a considerable risk of refusal purely due to context. Today, it is evaluated on whether it compromises security, not on where it is deployed.
The same applies to industrial instrumentation such as flow meters, pressure regulators, valve systems, or control algorithms used in nuclear plants but also usable in thermal, chemical, or hydrogen facilities. Earlier, a nuclear reference could trigger a Section 4 rejection. Now, such inventions can be assessed like any other industrial technology.
Healthcare and radiation-related applications provide another clear example. Technologies involving controlled radiation for diagnostics or treatment were often caught in overbroad interpretations of “atomic energy.” Under the amended law, they are more clearly distinguishable from strategic nuclear activity.
Clean energy and research tools also fall into this newly clarified space. Simulation software, AI-based monitoring systems, materials research tools, or efficiency-enhancing components used in nuclear research environments previously faced high legal uncertainty. Today, patentability depends on sensitivity, not association.
Under the new framework, the question is no longer whether an invention touches nuclear energy at all. The real question now is whether the invention is sensitive, security-critical, or part of activities that are legally reserved only for the Government.
If it is, private patent rights are still restricted. But if it is not, the law no longer shuts the door at the threshold.
Why This Distinction Matters in Modern Innovation
This distinction is crucial when you look at how modern technology actually develops.
Consider a monitoring system designed to detect overheating, pressure fluctuations, or leaks inside a nuclear facility. Earlier, such a system could be rejected simply because of where it was deployed, even though the same technology might be used in oil refineries or chemical plants. Under the new regime, the focus shifts to whether the system compromises security or strategic control, not merely where it operates.
The same applies to industrial instrumentation, control algorithms, flow regulators, or safety valves that happen to be used in nuclear plants. These are often general engineering solutions, not nuclear technology in the strategic sense. Earlier, they existed in a legal grey zone. Today, they can be assessed on their actual function and risk.
Healthcare and radiation-related inventions are another example. Technologies involving controlled radiation for diagnostics or treatment were often caught in overly broad interpretations of “atomic energy.” The amended law makes it easier to separate civilian medical innovation from strategic nuclear activity.
Even software and AI tools used in nuclear research environments fall into this newly clarified space. Simulation systems, predictive maintenance tools, or materials research platforms may interact with nuclear infrastructure without being sensitive or security-critical in themselves. The new legal framework allows that nuance to be recognized.
What the Amendment Does Not Change
It is important to be clear about what this change does not do. It does not remove government oversight. It does not open the door to patenting core nuclear fuel processes or strategic technologies. It does not dilute national security protections. What it does is replace an automatic exclusion with a more thoughtful evaluation.
This shift is also timely. India is expanding its clean energy ambitions, investing in advanced manufacturing, healthcare technology, and deep-tech research. Many of these innovations sit close to nuclear environments without being nuclear in the strategic sense. A patent system that treats all such innovation as off-limits discourages investment and R&D. A system that filters carefully encourages responsible participation.
The biggest takeaway is simple. The law has moved from asking “does this involve nuclear energy?” to asking “is this actually sensitive or security-critical?”
That difference matters to innovators, companies, and research institutions that previously felt India was closed to entire categories of advanced technology. Sometimes, the most meaningful legal changes are not announced loudly. They appear quietly, in a few lines of statutory text, and change how decisions are made.
This is one of those changes.
